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Philosophy and Theology

This reflection takes up recent literature on sex selection of children, especially
by abortion, and the right of children to be loved. Many pro-choice advocates hold
that sex-selective abortion (SSA) is morally problematic, if not impermissible. Many
arguments against sex-selective abortion, like those presented below by J.M. Milliez in “Sex Selection for Non-Medical Purposes” (Reproductive Medicine Online,
February 2007) only make sense on the implicit assumption that the human fetus
is a person with rights, but this premise renders problematic not just sex-selective
abortion but abortion generally. Wishing to avoid this implicit assumption, Wendy
Rogers, Angela Ballantyne, and Heather Draper in their article “Is Sex-Selective
Abortion Morally Justified and Should It Be Prohibited?” (Bioethics, November 2007)
provide several arguments that sex-selective abortion is wrong, without endorsing
(even implicitly) the intrinsic value of the human fetus as female or male. This ap
proach, I will argue, is problematic. A better approach to the question of the moral
permissibility of sex-selective abortion, and abortion generally, can be found in S.
Matthew Liao’s article “The Right of Children to Be Loved” (Journal o f Political
Philosophy, December 2006) on the right of children to receive the unconditional
love of their parents.
Sex selection can occur in three ways: prior to conception by sperm separation,
after conception but before implantation through genetic diagnosis of IVF embryos,
and after implantation by abortion. In a consideration of sex selection outside the
context of genetically sex-linked diseases, Milliez notes in his article that the first
“technique [i.e., sperm separation] raises very few ethical objections. . . . In 2001,
the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)
considered that, in the absence of robust arguments in favor of any potential harm,
preconception sex selection was not hazardous and therefore any ban would be
unjustified” (114).
Less ethical consensus exists about sex selection after conception through
selection and implantation of only male (or female) embryos. Some defend it as an
© 2008 The National Catholic Bioethics Center
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exercise of “procreative liberty,” 1 but others condemn it as discrimination against
gender equality.12This sex selection by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is forbid
den by law in India, South Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and ten other
European countries.
The third technique of sex selection is most widespread and the most con
demned—abortion of the male or female fetus sometime into pregnancy. Detection
and eradication of the developing female (or male) fetus can occur quite early in
pregnancy. “A single blood sample is sufficient to recognize the embryo as male
or female as early as the first weeks of pregnancy, enabling the elimination of any
embryo of undesirable sex with an anti-progesterone medication. However, this
method is strictly restricted to the screening of sex-linked genetic disorders or the
management of Rhesus immunization. Its use for sex selection for personal conve
nience is unanimously banned” (Milliez, 115).
Unanimously banned is not accurate, as abortion for sex selection remains
legal in many places, among them the United States and Canada, where abortion is
legal for any reason. It is true, however, that many people who describe themselves
as pro-choice nevertheless oppose sex-selective abortion. “Nearly all societies of
reproductive medicine, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne
cologists __ , are opposed to sex-selection abortion” (Milliez, 116). However, from
a pro-choice perspective, there is some difficulty in explaining why fetal killing for
gender preference should be wrong. Indeed, some of the arguments given for con
demnation of sex-selective abortion would seem to apply equally to sperm separation
or pre-implantation selection, which is often defended on grounds of reproductive
liberty. Other arguments against sex-selective abortion apply equally to all kinds of
abortion. Of course, it is consistent simply to say that any abortion, chosen for any
reason including wanting not to give birth to a girl, is ethically permissible, but rela
tively few people who call themselves pro-choice embrace this consistent position.
In their article, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper provide several arguments that
sex-selective abortion is wrong, a view that many think is compatible with a general
defense of abortion. They therefore accept the “argument that we should try to un
derstand women’s decision to use SSA and empathize with the unjust choice they are
forced to make, without accepting that the practice itself is morally justified” (522).
Their first argument concludes that sex-selective abortion is wrong because, on
either a broad or a narrow interpretation of autonomous choice, sex-selective abor
tion practiced in countries with a strong preference for a son is not an autonomous
choice. Society puts tremendous pressure on women to have male children, thereby
undermining the preferences they would otherwise have.

1A. Malpani, A. Malpani, and D. Modi, “Preimplantation Sex Selection for Family
Balancing in India,” Human Reproduction 17.1 (January 2002): 11-12. Ethics Committee
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Preconception Gender Selection for
Nonmedical Reasons,” Fertility and Sterility 75.5 (May 2001): 861-864.
2J. Savulescu, “Sex Selection: The Case For” Medical Journal o f Australia 171.7
(October 1999): 373-375.
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The first thing to note is that sex-selective abortion is not considered wrong
in itself by these authors, but only wrong in the circumstances of a certain cultural
context. They simply do not consider the ethics of someone, for example, in Indiana
who aborts a boy because of a preference for a girl. What would or would not count
as the relevant “cultural context” is similarly not taken up. What if you were from
India but now live in Indianapolis? What if you split time between both places and
are, by birth and heritage, multicultural? It seems odd to hinge the ethics of killing
human beings prior to birth on cultural context.
Second, the suppressed premise in the argument seems to be that whatever is
not an autonomous choice is morally wrong.3 Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper give
no argument for this premise. If the premise were accepted, it would be the case
that many abortions as now performed in the United States (not just sex-selective
abortion in India or China) are morally wrong because they are not freely chosen by
women but rather only submitted to under pressure from other people.4
The authors also appeal to other considerations in condemning sex-selective
abortion: “A second and separate reason why SSA is morally unjustified relates to
the harms that attach to the practice. These include perpetuation of discrimination
against women, disruption to social and familial networks, and increased violence
against women” (522).
First, there is an appeal to justice, a justice violated by discrimination. Milliez
registers this objection to sex-selective abortion seemingly on behalf of the female
fetus herself: “Elimination of girls is philosophically and morally unacceptable if
perceived as a gender discrimination practice contrary to the principle of equality
and in conflict with Kant’s moral [teaching] and the notion that all children must be
considered as an end, not as a means” (117). Likewise, the International Federation of
Gynecology and Obstetrics issued a statement, reproduced in Milliez’s article, which
expressed “concerns about the selection for children with presumed gender charac
teristics desired by their parents rather than being an end in and of themselves” (116).
Sex-selective abortion is wrong because it is a form of unjust discrimination.
The question is, against whom is this unjust discrimination practiced? Given
a denial of fetal personhood, the discrimination in question cannot be against the
human fetus herself or himself. Discrimination is only problematic when practiced
against persons who merit equal and just treatment. To discriminate between non
persons—plucking the red roses but leaving the white, for example—is not ethically

3It is unclear whether Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper are addressing the objective
morality of the act or the subjective responsibility of the agent. I have assumed here that they
are addressing the former, since they, as the title of the article suggests, primarily addresses
the question of whether sex-selective abortion is morally justified and should be prohibited.
If the point is simply that those who choose sex-selective abortion in certain contexts are
coerced into choices they would rather not have made, then their point is not controversial,
or limited to sex-selective abortion.
4For evidence for this empirical claim, see for example, the literature cited at “Abor
tion is the Unchoice,” http://www.unfairchoice.info/pblresearch.htm.
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problematic in itself, since these plants do not have rights nor merit equal respect as
persons. Since the human fetus is not considered a person on the typical pro-choice
view, concerns about discrimination against the human fetus should not be relevant
in considering actions taken against humans prior to birth.
However, if the male or female fetus is a person, then not just sex-selective
abortion, but abortion in general becomes problematic. Taken at face value, the
quotation from Milliez renders all abortion morally condemnable: “All children
must be considered as an end, not as a means” (117). On the other hand, if abortion
in general does not end the lives of “girls” and “children,” to use Milliez’s language,
then sex-selective abortion cannot be problematic on this ground. The pro-choice
view generally is that we can accord women the respect they deserve as ends in
themselves without extending this respect to female human beings in utero. Obvi
ously, if all human females (and males) merit respect as ends in themselves regardless
of age or state of dependence, then not just sex-selective abortion but all abortion is
problematic. On the other hand, if the female fetus is not a person, then presumably
one can respect the rights of adult female human beings and nevertheless kill fetal
female human beings.
Rather than appeal to discrimination against the fetus herself, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper ground the wrongness of sex-selective abortion in terms of its per
petuating discriminatory views, such as that girls are worthless burdens whose births
should be prevented. As such, sex-selective abortion is viewed as a discriminatory
and oppressive practice that fails to accord women the respect they deserve (522).
Given current cultural milieus, this rationale covers not sex-selective abor
tion of males, but only of females. In addition, no developed account is given for
the questionable assumption that sex-selective abortion perpetuates discriminatory
views which negatively affect women and girls in society. Indeed, some have sug
gested that widespread sex-selective abortion of females prior to birth would seem
not to decrease the value of women but rather to increase their perceived value. In
the words of Milliez, “The profound gender imbalance [in India and China] has led
to a dramatic scarcity of girls, who are now regarded as most valuable” (115). Of
course, a sound understanding of the human person would not accord value to him
or her in terms of being wanted or unwanted by others, but rather would recognize
the intrinsic value of all human beings. Human beings should not be valued accord
ing to the laws of supply and demand (“being wanted”) as if they were commercial
goods, but rather should be valued for their inherent dignity. But this premise leads
to a condemnation of abortion generally.
Finally, Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper appeal to the bad consequences of
sex-selective abortion: “Further harm from SSA lies in the resultant severe imbal
ance in the sex ratio, leading to millions of men being unable to find a partner and
found a family. ... The likely social effects are thought to include increased criminal
behavior and social disruption with banditry, violence and revolutions historically
more common in areas with large numbers of excess males” (522).
I believe that it is correct that sex-selective abortion as practiced in India and
China harms those societies. But the defender of abortion must be careful not to rely
too heavily on the premise that sex-selective abortion is wrong and may be outlawed
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on this basis. Evidence has been adduced that abortion generally is harmful to so
ciety: psychologically, physically, and socially harmful to the women who undergo
abortions and harmful to the culture that allows its weakest and most vulnerable
members to be terminated by private force. 5Given this evidence, not just sex-selec
tive abortion but also abortion for other reasons violates the common good.
However, some defenders of abortion appeal to the good of society in justify
ing abortion, arguing that abortion reduces population and thereby promotes the
common good. Given these assumptions, sex-selective abortion of females would
be particularly good for society, since a disproportionate reduction in females limits
population much more effectively than an equal reduction of male and female. One
male can father virtually limitless numbers of children, but each woman can only
bear relatively few. Women are the limiting factor in reproduction. Since one man
can father more children in a month than any woman could bear in an entire lifetime,
the most effective way to reduce population is to reduce the number of women.
A final reason given to oppose sex-selective abortion is that it leads to an in
crease in violence against women. Rogers, Ballantyne, and Draper admit that this
connection is based on merely anecdotal evidence. However, even if sex-selective
abortion does increase the likelihood of violence against women, evidence has also
been given that abortion generally is connected with increased violence against
women.6 Thus, the rationale given to condemn sex-selective abortion may apply
equally to abortion undertaken for other reasons.
Many of these consequences would arise equally from the non-existence of adult
women from the other forms of sex selection such as sperm separation or implantation
of IVF embryos of the desired sex. If aborting a female perpetuates discriminatory
views about women, why would sperm selection to preclude conception of a female
be any different? If disruption of gender balance alone is decisive for condemna
tion of sex-selective abortion, why does it matter if this imbalance arises because of
sperm separation or sex-selective abortion? As noted earlier, many individuals and
groups hold that sex selection prior to conception is morally unproblematic, but the
societal ills recognized by Rogers, Ballantyne, Draper and others also would also
take place if the gender imbalance occurred through sperm separation.
In his article “The Right of Children to Be Loved,” Liao considers the ques
tion of the ethics of sex selection. He argues that it is not mere rhetoric but a matter
of justice that children receive love from others. Love can be commanded, and to
love another can be a moral duty. Further, he proposes that this right of a child to
be loved is a human right. Children need to be loved to develop essential capacities
that they need for a good life. Liao writes,

5See Thomas W. Strahan, ed., Detrimental Effects o f Abortion: An Annotated Bibli
ography With Commentary, 3rd ed. (Springfield, IL: Acorn Publishing, 2001); and Robert
Spitzer, Healing the Culture: A Commonsense Philosophy o f Happiness, Freedom and the
Life Issues (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000).
6See Strahan, Detrimental Effects, sections 3.38-3.43.
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Human beings have rights to those conditions that are . . . essential for a good
life. As human beings, children therefore have rights to those conditions that
are . . . essential for a good life. Being loved is a condition that is . . . essential
for children to have a good life. Therefore, children have a right to be loved. To
explicate this argument, let me begin by characterizing the kind of love at issue,
namely, parental love, which has the following characteristics: To love a child
is to seek a highly intense interaction with the child, where one values the child
for the child’s sake, where one seeks to bring about and to maintain physical and
psychological proximity with the child, where one seeks to promote the child’s
well-being for the child’s sake, and where one desires that the child reciprocate
or, at least, is responsive to, one’s love. One important feature of parental love
is valuing the child for the child’s sake. As a child psychologist Mia Pringle
argues: “The basic and all-pervasive feature of parental love is that the child is
valued unconditionally and for his own sake, irrespective o f his sex, appearance,
abilities or personality; that this love is given without expectation of or demand
for gratitude.” (422, emphasis added)

Liao’s argument is quite important for a number of reasons. First, he provides a
philosophical rationale for a right to be loved that is asserted in a number of interna
tional declarations, but seldom argued for. Second, if his argument is correct, it may
cause some difficulties for defenders of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s violinist argument
for abortion. In the violinist argument, the personhood of the human fetus is not
denied, but what is denied is a duty of responsibility of the mother to promote the
well-being of her child.7 However, if parents do have duties to their children, these
duties may include gestation of the children prior to birth. In contrast to Thomp
son, who posits that the first stages of motherhood are like being hooked up to an
unrelated, adult violinist, Liao provides reasons to believe that a mother (or father)
does have duties toward their own children. Finally, the duty of parents to love their
children, and to value them irrespective of their sex, indicates perhaps the primary
reason why sex-selective abortion and abortion generally are morally wrong. Liao’s
important work on this topic, as well as his writing on a variety of other subjects,
merits careful attention.
Christopher K aczor, Ph .D.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

7For more on this argument, see Christopher Kaczor, “The Violinist and Double Effect
Reasoning,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6.4 (Winter 2006):.661-669.

570

